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The iGSE addresses the most significant gap and largest challenge for verification of nuclear non-proliferation: the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials production. The project has been initiated to develop and demonstrate technologies and procedures for remote environmental sampling and other novel methodologies that would allow to detect clandestine production of nuclear materials usable for weapons production. The project is based on the required expertise; the independence of scientists from governmental, diplomatic, and organizational interests; real demonstrations in field tests; coordinated research efforts and joint applications for funding; and public availability of the project results through this website, articles and other publications, and presentations.
- The iGSE held a panel on "New Technologies for Verifying the Additional Protocol" on May 10 at the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. For details and presentations, click here.
- The work of iGSE Members on Kr-85 as a tracer for clandestine reprocessing operations is mentioned in the article Can we keep tabs on stockpiles of nuclear fuel? in the magazine New Scientist, issue 2757. To read the article online, click here.
- The "Joint Programme On The Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA Safeguards" has released its first report Simulation of atmospheric noble gas concentrations to assess sampling procedures for the detection of clandestine reprocessing. For details, click here.
- To complement its extensive Kr-85 emission database, the iGSE has released a comprehensive list of Kr-85 measurement stations and their operators. For details, click here.
- The iGSE workshop on Matching analytical sensitivities with proliferation signature concentrations in the environment has been successfully concluded in November 2009. For details, click here.
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